R v Claros – 2019 ONCA 626 (Pacioocco):

[42] As indicated, the difficulty here is that the trial judge did not apply totality considerations. These considerations include whether the combined sentences, calculated individually and sentenced consecutively, would be longer than required to serve the principles of sentencing, or whether the combined sentence would be apt to crush the offender by undermining the hope for rehabilitation. Instead, the trial judge appears to have treated the Thunder Bay time as if it was being served in connection with the Hamilton events. His reasoning improperly reflects double jeopardy overtones. Specifically, the trial judge spoke of the Thunder Bay sentence being “for effectively” or “virtually” the same thing as the Hamilton sentence.

[43] First, Mr. Claros was not being sentenced in Hamilton for effectively or virtually the same thing he was sentenced for in Thunder Bay. The relevant offences were committed at different times and hundreds of miles apart, separately endangering two different communities. The fact that the same firearm was possessed and that the offences fell within a few days of each other does not undercut the fact that they were different crimes.

[44] Second, and more importantly, apart from totality considerations, there is no principled reason for reducing Mr. Claros’s sentence because he had previously been sentenced for the same kind of conduct, or because the distinct offences involved the same weapon or were temporally linked. Put bluntly, there is no sentencing discount for repeated or temporally linked, but distinct, criminal behaviour.