[63] I would summarize the above discussion as follows:

1) Minimum fines establish sentencing floors that apply regardless of ordinary sentencing principles. The imposition of fines above the minimum threshold is governed by ordinary sentencing principles, as well as any principles set out in the relevant legislation.

2) Section 59(2) of the POA vests a discretionary authority in trial judges to provide relief from minimum fines in exceptional circumstances. The burden is on those seeking the grant of relief to establish that relief is warranted based on the relevant considerations.

3) Section 59(2) applies exceptionally. It will be an unusual case in which the imposition of a minimum fine may be considered “unduly oppressive” or “otherwise not in the interests of justice”.

4) Whether a minimum fine is unduly oppressive usually will depend on consideration of personal hardship. The bar for relief is set very high. Mere difficulty in paying a minimum fine is inadequate to justify discretionary relief.

5) Whether a minimum fine is otherwise not in the interests of justice involves consideration of not only the interests of an individual offender but also the interests of the community protected by the relevant public welfare legislation.

6) The discretion under s. 59(2) cannot be exercised arbitrarily. Trial judges must explain their reasons for invoking s. 59(2), and in particular must demonstrate both that the circumstances are exceptional and that it would be unduly oppressive or otherwise not in the interests of justice to apply the minimum fine.
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[66] As I have explained, unfairness is not the test under s. 59(2). The Legislature has decided what is fair in establishing minimum fines. Trial judges are required to apply those fines unless they conclude, in accordance with the requirements set out in s. 59(2), that relief from a minimum fine is warranted.