R v. AE, 2018 ONSC 471 (Boswell):

[1] R.C. BOSWELL J.:– Following a trial in June 2017, I found that the defendant, AE, was, between 2011 and 2015, engaged in a lifestyle that involved significant criminality. He operated as a pimp and exploited two young women; he assaulted both; he criminally harassed one; he trafficked in cocaine and marijuana; and he possessed a loaded, prohibited firearm without a license.
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54 The Alberta Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Tang is often cited by sentencing judges in cases relating to pimping and/or exploitation. It was a 1997 case involving the offence of living off the avails of prostitution. It was obviously decided before the human trafficking provisions were added to the Criminal Code in 20059. It nevertheless continues to provide some measure of guidance in terms of factors one might consider when assessing where, on the spectrum of seriousness, any particular case lies.

[55] The court in Tang approved of a categorization of cases reflected in English courts that would sort cases into three tiers. The first tier — the most serious — involves cases where the offender has coerced the complainant into becoming a prostitute and has exercised a significant degree of control over her activities. The second tier lacks the element of coercion but involves the offender relying on the complainant’s earnings as his principal source of income. The third tier involves cases where the offender receives money from the complainant, but their relationship lacks an exploitative character.

[56] The Alberta Court of Appeal, to be clear, did not wholly adopt a three-tiered system. They merely noted its helpfulness as a starting point. They expressly observed that when assessing the criminal culpability of a pimp living off the avails of prostitution, a “panoply” of factors should be considered, including:
1. The degree of coercion or control imposed by the pimp on the prostitute’s activities;
2. The amount of money received by the pimp and the extent to which the pimp allowed the prostitutes to retain their earnings;
3. The age of the prostitutes and their numbers;
4. Any special vulnerability on the part of the prostitutes;
5. The working conditions in which the prostitutes were expected or encouraged to operate, including their physical surroundings in terms of soliciting customers and servicing customers, and safety concerns, in addition to whether appropriate health safeguards were taken;
6. The degree of planning and sophistication, including whether the pimp was working in concert with others;
7. The size of the pimp’s operations, including the numbers of customers the prostitutes were expected to service;
8. The duration of the pimp’s exploitative conduct;
9. The degree of violence, if any, apart from that inherent in the pimp’s parasitic activities;
10. The extent to which inducements such as drugs or alcohol were employed by the pimp;
11. The effect on the prostitutes of the pimp’s exploitation; and,
12. The extent to which the pimp demanded or compelled sexual favours for himself from the … prostitutes.

[57] In R. v. Miller Justice Hill, of this court, adopted the Tang list and added several more
factors of his own, including:
13. The age of the customers attracted to the bawdy-house operation;
14. Steps taken by the accused to evade detection by authorities; and,
15. Attempts by the accused to prevent a prostitute from leaving his employ.

[58] Cases subsequent to Tang and Miller — both before and after the human trafficking provisions were added to the Criminal Code — have referred to and made use of the foregoing factors when assessing the moral blameworthiness of individual offenders.
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[92]The circumstances in this case, in my view, tend to straddle the first and second tiers described in the Tang decision. In other words, AE did not procure or coerce either of KJ or AB to become prostitutes. They did that of their own choosing. But he did use coercive tactics to keep them working and he did take all, or virtually all of their earnings. He exploited each of them. He treated them in a degrading and inhuman fashion, as though they were income producing property. He assaulted them both. His treatment of these two young women was despicable, even if they were the ones to approach him first.

[93] The exploitation of KJ went on for years. The exploitation of AB went on for months.

[94] The human trafficking charges in relation to KJ (count two) relate to a time prior to the introduction of mandatory minimum sentences. In my view, AE’s conduct towards KJ, and particularly the length of time the exploitation went on, warrants a sentence at the higher end of the
range. Subject to what I say momentarily about the totality principle, an appropriate sentence on count two is seven years imprisonment.

[95] The exploitation of AB was not nearly as long and not characterized by the same kind of threatening behaviour KJ testified about. Still, AE took all of her earnings and treated her as a commodity. The mandatory minimum applies in relation to the charges involving AB. In my view, an appropriate sentence for the human trafficking of AB (count twelve) is five years, which will run concurrent to the sentence for human trafficking in relation to KJ.