R v P(R), 1990 OJ No. 3418 (Doherty – HCJ):

[16] Assuming relevance, evidence of utterances made by a deceased (although the rule is not limited to deceased persons) which evidence her state of mind are admissible. If the statements are explicit statements of a state of mind, they are admitted as exceptions to the hearsay rule. If those statements permit an inference as to the speaker’s state of mind, they are regarded as original testimonial evidence and admitted as circumstantial evidence from which a state of mind can be inferred. The result is the same whichever route is taken, although circumstantial evidence of a state of mind poses added problems rising out of the inference drawing process: R. v. Wysochan (1930), 54 C.C.C. 172 at pp. 173-4 (Sask. C.A.); Home v. Corbeil, [1955] 4 D.L.R. 750, [1955] O.W.N. 842 (H.C.J.); affirmed without specific reference to this point 2 D.L.R. (2d) 543, [1956] O.W.N. 391 (C.A.); Smith v. Shanklin (1932), 5 M.ER. 204 at p. 221; affirmed [1933] 4 D.L.R. 815, [1933] S.C.R. 340; R. v. Workman, [1963] 1 C.C.C. 297 at pp. 307-8 (Alta. S.C.A.D.) affirmed, [1963] 2 C.C.C. 1, [1963] S.C.R. 266, 40 C.R. 1; Wigmore on Evidence (Chadbourn rev. 1976), vol. 6, at pp. 129-38, 320-2; R. v. Maskery and Ditta, an unreported judgment of Watt J., released November 28, 1985; R. v. Burnett and Ruthbern Holdings Ltd. (1986), 25 C.C.C. (3d) 111, 54 O.R. (2d) 65 (H.C.J.); McCormick, ibid., p. 843ff.; Federal Rules of Evidence (1974), rule 803(3); Report of the Federal Provincial Task Force on Uniform Rules of Evidence (1982) at p. 201, 204-6; R. v. Moghal (1977), 65 Cr. App. R. 56 at pp. 63; People v. Madson, 638 E 2d 18 at pp. 26-8 (Colo.); United States v. Brown, supra, at pp. 762-3.
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[23] Evidence of the deceased’s state of mind may, in turn, be relevant as circumstantial evidence that the deceased subsequently acted in accordance with that avowed state of mind. Where a deceased says, “I will go to Ottawa tomorrow”, the statement affords direct evidence of the state of mind – an intention to go to Ottawa tomorrow – and circumstantial evidence that the deceased in fact went to Ottawa on that day. If either the state of mind, or the fact to be inferred from the existence of the state of mind is relevant, the evidence is receivable subject to objections based on undue prejudice. R. v. Moore (1984), 15 C.C.C. (3d) 541 at pp. 569-70 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada refused C.C.C. loc. cit., [1985] 1 S.C.R. x, 58 N.R. 312n; Home v. Corbeil, supra; R. v. McKenzie (1986), 32 C.C.C. (3d) 527 at pp. 532-5 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Belowitz, an unreported judgment of Bowlby J. released October 22, 1987, at pp. 8-11; R. v. Maskery and Ditta, supra; McCormick, ibid., pp. 846-51; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 at p. 296 (1892); A. Sheppard, Evidence (1988), pp. 467-9.

[24] An utterance indicating that a deceased had a certain intention or design will afford evidence that the deceased acted in accordance with that stated intention or plan where it is reasonable to infer that the deceased did so. The reasonableness of the inference will depend on a number of variables including the nature of the plan described in the utterance, and the proximity in time between the statement as to the plan and the proposed implementation of the plan.