R v. Kawal, 2018 ONSC 7538 (Harris):

[11] Handguns are a social evil. The Supreme Court has said and there can be no possible argument against it, “Gun-related crime poses grave danger to Canadians.” R. v. Nur 2015 SCC 15, per Chief Justice McLachlin, at para. 1, see also Justice Moldaver in dissent, at para. 131 and Justice Watt, as he then was, in R. v. Gayle, [1996] O.J. No. 3020 (S.C.), at para. 28. The primary purpose of handguns is to maim and to kill. Lawyers and judges see first-hand the destruction wrought by handguns. They are a disease, a plague on our communities. We have the means at our disposal to eradicate or at least to drastically curtail them. It is difficult to understand why our society would not do everything in its power to ensure that handguns are not available for criminal purposes.

[12] Harming a person without a weapon is not necessarily easy. But with a firearm, very little is needed. A slight degree of pressure applied to the trigger, a causal aim, and someone will likely be killed or severely injured. It is all too easy. We have come to the point where no intelligence or much of anything else is needed to kill or wreak grievous harm on another person. Malevolence is all that is required. Unfortunately, this is not always in short supply. That is a daunting prospect.

[13] The proliferation of handguns in the Greater Toronto Area has been decried by the courts and the public for many years. It is a pressing and urgent matter of public safety. Ten years ago, the serious concern of growing gun violence was said by the Court of Appeal to be a necessary consideration upon sentencing: see R. v. Brown, 2009 ONCA 563, [2009] O.J. No. 2908, at paras. 29-33, affirming [2007] O.J. No. 5659 (S.C.). It is even more so now what with record murder numbers in Toronto and the continuing increase of gun crimes and violence: see Justice Moldaver in dissent in Nur, para. 131 and see generally with respect to taking into account local conditions R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] S.C.J. No. 64, at paras. 90-104.

[14] Just last week, the Court of Appeal said in R. v. Omar, 2018 ONCA 975, per Sharpe J.A. for the majority, “[54] I am, of course, aware of the grave problem caused by illegal guns and drugs in our society. Everyone in the criminal justice system appreciates fully that the public is understandably alarmed by the prevalence of gun violence that threatens public safety and the public looks to the police for protection. I certainly do not suggest that a community’s desire to live free from the threat of illegal handguns is irrational or impulsive. The law must also recognize that the police have a very difficult and dangerous job to perform.”

[15] The three guns involved in these criminal offences constitute a central aggravating feature in the sentencing of Kawal and Nicholson. The importance of general deterrence, disseminating a message to the public by the imposition of a substantial sentence, varies with respect to the specific offence at issue. For many offences, such as offences committed in the heat of the moment, the philosophy of general deterrence may well collapse. In the category of handgun possession and use, however, general deterrence is a central and vital consideration.

[16] A person does not stumble upon an illegal handgun. There is a process of purchasing from a trafficker and secreting the handgun to avoid detection and prosecution. There is a high degree of deliberation and contemplation involved. In order to dissuade those who would possess and use firearms, there is a duty to ensure that there is no mistake about the not-give-an-inch opposition and contempt for all that handguns represent. The utilitarian philosophy animating general deterrence is pertinent. The danger handguns pose to the community cannot be overstated. Word must circulate that appropriate and fit sentences for handguns will necessarily be severe and lengthy sentences.