R v. Mott – 2013 ONSC 1768 (Gauthier):

[33] Further, I would emphasize that in Smith, Dambrot J. points out at paragraph 35 that several other judges and authors have concluded that a new bail hearing is required when an accused has been rendered by a surety and committed to prison.

[34] The court, in Smith, further points out, at paragraphs 50 and 51 that: … where a surety is named, he or she is named ‘in the order’. As a result, a justice who is otherwise authorized to substitute one surety for another cannot do so where the surety is named. In such a case, the justice would be amending the underlying release order, something that the justice is not authorized to do. The fact that the justice may not amend the release order is particularly clear from s. 767.1(2), which provides: (2) Where a person substituted for a surety under a recognizance pursuant to subsection (1) signs the recognizance, the original surety is discharged, but the recognizance and the order for judicial interim release pursuant to which the recognizance was entered into are not otherwise affected. [Emphasis added] If there was any doubt, the emphasized words in s. 767.1(2) make plain that a simple substitution of sureties cannot take place where, as here, an accused is obliged by the release order to reside with his or her surety and the surety’s address is specified.

[35] The need for a new judicial interim release hearing on the rendering of an accused in David Mott’s circumstances (i.e. with a named surety and conditions requiring the accused to reside with the surety) reflects the importance of the suitability of the surety, as well as the duty of a surety to ensure the accused’s presence in court for trial, and to otherwise supervise the accused and ensure his or her compliance with the conditions in the release order.