R v Candir, 2009 ONCA 915 (Watt):

[55] In cases like this, where the prosecutor alleges that the murder charged was motivated by the appellant’s anger in the deceased’s decision to end the relationship, the prosecutor is entitled to adduce evidence to prove the deceased’s contemporaneous mental or emotional state with respect to the accused, such as dislike, hatred or fear of the accused. From the deceased’s state of mind, the trier of fact will be asked to infer and can conclude that the deceased acted in accordance with his or her emotional state and that his or her conduct supplied the accused with his or her own motivation to act: P. (R.) at p. 339; R. v. Bari (2006), 215 C.C.C. (3d) 346 (N.B.C.A.), at para. 23; R. v. Lemky (1992), 17 B.C.A.C. 71, at para. 24; Foreman at para. 28.

[56] The prosecutor may tender explicit statements of the declarant’s state of mind or statements that give rise to an inference about the declarant’s state of mind. The former are hearsay and require an exception to establish their admissibility. The latter are not hearsay and are admitted as circumstantial evidence from which the declarant’s state of mind may be inferred: P. (R.) at p. 341. Whether admitted by exception or as beyond the exclusionary reach of the hearsay rule, the statements should be contemporaneous with the state of mind of which they are evidence.

[57] Necessity was not an issue here. The declarant was dead. To justify reception under the principled exception, the prosecutor was required to demonstrate that the statements were reliable because of the circumstances in which they were made. Those circumstances must be sufficient to serve as a surrogate for cross-examination of the declarant, the traditional method of testing the well-documented frailties of hearsay evidence: perception, memory, narration and sincerity.

[58] Trial judges are well-situated to determine the extent to which hearsay dangers in the case at hand are of concern and whether they can be alleviated. A trial judge’s ruling on admissibility, including findings on reliability, if informed by correct legal principles, is entitled to deference: R. v. Blackman, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 298, at para. 36. The trial judge was there. We were not.